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Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co.' was an action in fraud and
deceit in inducing plaintiff to execute a final release dis-
charging the defendant from liability under its policy of in-
surance of which the plaintiff was the beneficiary. The com-
plaint alleged that the release was procured by giving the
plaintiff the "impression" that she was signing a receipt for
the full amount due for her son's accidental death, and that
she realized for the first time when she saw the draft that
the amount was insufficient to cover the full benefits to which
she was entitled. The defendant demurred for insufficiency
to state a cause of action on the ground that the release was
valid and binding upon the plaintiff since she was able to read
and accepted the benefits thereof. The trial judge overruled
the demurrer.
In affirming the order of the trial judge, the Supreme Court
reiterated the established rule that in passing upon a de-
murrer the court is limited to a consideration of the pleadings
under attack, all of the factual allegations thereof properly
pleaded being deemed admitted, as well as such inferences of
law or conclusions of fact as may properly arise from them.
The Court held that it was inferable from the allegations of
the complaint that defendant's agents represented to plaintiff
that she was signing a release for the correct amount due her,
and the fact that a lesser amount was being paid could only
be discovered from the draft and that it was reasonable to
conclude from the facts alleged that the plaintiff could not
ascertain from the release that she was to receive a lesser
amount. Under the circumstances, the rule that one is bound
by the terms of a written instrument signed by him would not
bar plaintiff's cause of action.2
Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co.3 was an action in fraud
and deceit arising out of the purchase of plaintiff's land by
*Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 236 S. C. 272, 113 S. E. 2d 817 (1960).
2. Jones v. Cooper, 234 S. C. 477, 109 S. E. 2d 5 (1959).
3. 237 S. C. 121, 115 S. E. 2d 799 (1960).
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thp defendant. The complaint alleged that defendant's agents
represented that the land would be used for planting trees
whereas in fact the power company intended to create a lake
in connection with the erection of a steam plant. It was fur-
ther alleged that the agents represented that the company was
paying only sixty dollars an acre whereas in fact it had pur-
chased adjoining property for considerably more. The de-
fendant's demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action was overruled by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court followed the settled rule that in passing
on a demurrer the court is limited to a consideration of the
pleadings under attack, all of the factual allegations prop-
erly pleaded being deemed admitted. The court noted that a
demurrer does not admit the allegation of fraud and deceit
because this constitutes a mere conclusion of the pleader; and
that a demurrer does not admit the inferences drawn by the
plaintiff from the facts alleged, it being the court's duty to
determine whether or not such inferences are justified. The
conclusion that an important element in stating a cause of
action in fraud and deceit was lacking in factual allegations
in the complaint, to wit, that plaintiff suffered damage as a
result of the alleged misrepresentations, necessitated a re-
versal of the order of the trial judge.
The appeal in Porter v. News & Courier4 was from the
order of the trial judge overruling defendant's demurrer to
the complaint in an action for libel. The pertinent allegations
were that the defendant published defamatory matter in its
newspaper concerning plaintiff's trial and acquittal in the
general sessions court on charges of obtaining money to
which he was not entitled because of an error of a grocery
clerk in cashing plaintiff's check. The defendant contended
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because
(1) the publication was privileged and malice was not alleged
and (2) the article was not libelous per se and no intrinsic
facts were alleged that plaintiff had been degraded or had
suffered loss. The Supreme Court held that the demurrer was
properly overruled for the reasons that privilege is a matter
of defense ordinarily not available on demurrer and the publi-
cation could be understood to charge plaintiff with the crime
of larceny, or breach of trust with fraudulent intent, either
of which is libelous per se.
4. 237 S. C. 102, 115 S. E. 2d 656 (1960).
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Costas v. Florence Printing Co.5 was an action for libel
based upon the publication of an article in defendant's news-
paper giving an account of a fight between persons at the
plaintiff's place of business. The complaint alleged that the
article was defamatory in that it reflected upon the plaintiff
in charging him with operating a place of business where
disorderly conduct was tolerated. The defendant's demurrer
to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action for the reason that the
article was not libelous per se and no special damages were
alleged was overruled by the trial judge. In reversing, the
Supreme Court followed the rule that in passing upon a de-
murrer the court is limited to a consideration of the pleadings
under attack, all of the factual allegations that are properly
pleaded being deemed admitted for that purpose. The Court
concluded that the publication was not libelous per se and
there were no allegations of special damages or intrinsic cir-
cumstances which would render the words libelous, hence the
demurrer should have been sustained. During the pendency
of the appeal in the action, the plaintiff moved to amend his
complaint so as to allege special damages and this motion
was granted by the trial judge. The Supreme Court held the
order to be in error since the appeal acted as a stay to further
proceedings in the cause under the appropriate statute.
8
In Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James,7 the question as to
whether or not the rights of a subrogee were extinguished by
a settlement between the third party and the insured was
raised by demurrer to the complaint for insufficiency and
was resolved, in accordance with the rule, from the facts prop-
erly pleaded and appearing upon the fact of the complaint.
The action was brought against the tort-feasor and the com-
plaint alleged that a settlement was entered into with the
insured after defendant had been given notice of plaintiff's
subrogation rights, and sought to recover the amount which
plaintiff had paid to the insured under its collision policy. In
overruling the order of the lower court which had sustained
the demurrer, the Supreme Court reviewed the authorities
and concluded from them that the plaintiff's subrogation
rights were not extinguished under the circumstances alleged
in the complaint.
5. 237 S. C. 655, 118 S. E. 2d 696 (1961).
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 7-422 (1952).
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The appeal in Plenge v. Russell8 was from an order of the
circuit court sustaining a demurrer to the complaints for in-
sufficiency. The actions, consolidated by agreement, were
brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act seeking an ad-
judication as to the rights of the plaintiff physicians respect-
ing the practice of radiology in the Spartanburg General Hos-
pital. The demurrers for insufficiency to state a cause of
action were interposed on numerous grounds, one of which
questioned the existence of a justiciable controversy, cogniza-
ble under the Declaratory Judgments Act. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the test of the sufficiency of the com-
plaint in an action for declaratory relief is whether or not
it shows that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights
and not whether the plaintiff's theory is correct. The allega-
tions were held sufficient to state a justiciable controversy
requiring a hearing on the merits, since they involved, among
other things, consideration of certain legislative acts and the
validity of regulations of the hospital.
In Watson v. Watson,9 a demurrer was interposed to a
counterclaim by one of the defendants in a partition action
and a motion to strike the counterclaim, both of which were
overruled by the presiding judge. The action was brought by
certain of the heirs of the decedent to partition lands of the
estate and the defendants were the administratrix and the
sole surviving heirs, distributees, and next of kin of the
deceased. The defendant filing the counterclaim sought to
recover for services rendered the deceased during her life
time and the demurrer challenged her right to do so upon
numerous grounds. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme
Court concluded that the counterclaim did not fall within the
provisions of the statute permitting the filing of a counter-
claim, and could not be filed by one of the heirs in a partition
action to recover for services rendered the deceased. 10
Pleading Agency
The appeal in Hunter v. Hyder" presented the question as
to whether or not it is necessary in pleading a cause of action
against a master or principal based upon a tort committed
by a servant or agent to allege the fact of agency, or whether
8. 236 S. C. 473, 115 S. E. 2d 177 (1960).
9. 237 S. C. 274, 117 S. E. 2d 145 (1960).
10. CODE o LAws OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 10-703 (1952).
11. 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 493 (1960).
1961]
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an allegation that the wrong was done by the principal or mas-
ter is sufficient. The action was based upon alleged tres-
passes committed by the defendant in entering upon plain-
tiff's lands, cutting fences, and removing timber, but there
was no allegation in the complaint as to agency. The answer
contained a denial that defendant "or any of his agents or
servants" committed the delicts charged, and alleged further
that the trespasses, if any, were done by an independent con-
tractor. The trial judge admitted evidence by plaintiff that
the trespasses were committed by agents and servants of the
defendant and submitted the question of agency to the jury,
and this was charged as error. The Supreme Court noted
that pleadings should be considered as a whole and should be
liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties to the action, under the appropriate stat-
ute.12 Since the defendant expressly denied agency in his an-
swer and affirmatively alleged that the persons committing
the trespasses were not his agents and servants, the Court
held that the evidence as to agency was properly received and
the plaintiff had the right to attack in advance any matter in
defense set up in the answer. The Court found it unnecessary
to determine whether the complaint should have alleged that
the acts were committed by the defendant's agents and ser-
vants, since the pleadings as a whole raised the issue of
agency.
Judgment on the Pleadings
The appeal in Hamilton v. Patterson3 involved the pro-
priety of the order of the trial judge striking the answer
as irrelevant, sham and frivolous, and granting judgment to
the plaintiff on his complaint. The action was based upon a
judgment which the plaintiff had obtained against the de-
fendant in the State of Florida and sought to recover the
amount of the judgment obtained in that action. In the answer
defendant attempted to raise defenses relating to the merits
of the action and questioned plaintiff's right to recover the
amounts claimed to be due, and these allegations were stricken
upon plaintiff's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, apply-
ing the rule that an answer may properly be stricken when
it appears that the pleading is manifestly sham, irrelevant or
false, and is filed merely for the purpose of delay or without
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-602 (1952).
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good faith. Since there were no facts alleged in the answer
rebutting the presumption of regularity of the foreign judg-
ment, the Court was bound to give full faith and credit to it
and the defendant would not be permitted to relitigate the
merits of the controversy in this action.
Motion to Strike
Tate v. Oxner 14 involved an appeal from an order over-
ruling a motion to strike certain allegations from the com-
plaint on the grounds that the same were irrelevant, imma-
terial and prejudicial. The Supreme Court reiterated the
established rule that such an order is not appealable, recogniz-
ing only two exceptions: (1) where the motion to strike is in
the nature of a demurrer, and (2) where there is otherwise
a:n appealable issue before the court. Since the facts did not
bring the appeal within either of the two exceptions, the order
was deemed to be nonappealable. The Court noted, however,
that such refusal to strike would not be conclusive upon trial
on the merits and would not prejudice defendant in his efforts
to exclude testimony in support of the allegations.
In Kinard v. United Ins. Co.15 an action was brought by
the beneficiary of an insurance policy to recover damages
for the alleged wrongful cancellation thereof by the defendant.
Upon motion to require the plaintiff to elect between incon-
sistent causes of action, plaintiff stated that the action was
based upon fraudulent cancellation of the policy constituting a
breach of contract, accompanied by a fraudulent act. Defend-
ant then moved to strike from the complaint allegations per-
taining to fraud and deceit and allegations pertaining to bene-
fits under the contract, which motions were denied, and the
case proceeded to trial. Upon appeal from this ruling, the
Court held that the allegations complained of were relevant
on the issue of fraudulent acts alleged to have accompanied
the breach of the contract and affirmed the lower court on
this point. Similarly, the Court ruled that there was no error
in refusing to strike the allegations pertaining to benefits
under the contract, since the permanent and total disability
benefits were relevant to defendant's claim of lapse and the
death benefit was pertinent on the measure of damages. The
Court, however, reversed on other grounds, finding error in
14. 236 S. C. 313,114 S. E. 2d 225 (1960).
15. 237 S. C. 266, 116 S. E. 2d 906 (1960).
19611
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the failure of the trial judge to charge as to the burden of
proof and the form of the verdict after defendant had made
a timely request for such instructions.
Making More Definite and Certain
The questions of pleading involved in Seegars v. WIS-TV'8
concerned the propriety of the order of the trial judge requir-
ing plaintiff to make his complaint more definite and certain
and striking certain language of the complaint. The action
was based upon an alleged libel committed by the defendant
in reporting in a news broadcast under the facilities of its
television station an account of the arrest of the plaintiff and
others in connection with the beating of a school teacher in
Camden. The trial court granted defendant's motions to re-
quire the plaintiff to make his complaint more definite and
certain by stating with particularity the words, statements
or pictures which were alleged to be false. The Supreme Court
recognized that the circuit judge has a wide discretion in
passing on a motion of this nature under the applicable code
section,17 and found no abuse of discretion in requiring the
complaint to be made more definite and certain in the particu-
lars noted.
The defendant further moved to strike the language in the
complaint that the defendant is a "large, powerful and weal-
thy" corporation. The trial court struck the words "large"
and "powerful" but refused to strike "wealthy," and this
ruling was upheld on appeal, since the plaintiff could prop-
erly show the financial status of the defendant and its ability
to pay on the issue of punitive damages.
Vacating Default Judgment
The appeal in Davis v. Davis' was from an order vacat-
ing a default judgment in an action for divorce brought by
the husband, and permitting the wife to amend her answer or
otherwise plead to the complaint. It appeared that the wife
had signed an answer in the office of plaintiff's attorney
admitting the allegations of the complaint and joined in the
prayer for divorce. The answer was not filed and the decree
was obtained as a default decree upon the affidavit of plain-
16. 236 S. C. 355, 114 S. E. 2d 502 (1960).
17. CODE! OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-606 (1952).
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tiff's attorney that defendant was in default. The lower court
granted the petition to vacate the decree upon the ground
that there was a lack of notice to defendant, who had an-
swered, of the reference and application for the decree. The
Supreme Court affirmed and overruled plaintiff's contention
that the answer was a nullity since it was not verified, noting
that it was prepared by plaintiff's counsel and accepted and
retained by him, and this constituted a waiver of the absence
of verification.
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